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4. Settlement and Territory: a socio-ecological approach
to the evolution of settlement systems
John Bintliff
A model is presented to link the dynamics of rural settlement infill with mating networks and social
evolution. The critical importance of related transformations in marriage-patterns, settlement size and
village organisation is shown in a theory of the origin of city-states as politicisations of enlarged village
communities with 'corporate decision-making' institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of human territoriality within the discipline of
Archaeology, in particular the application of various
forms of Territorial or Catchment Analysis, has suffered
severe neglect during the later 1980s and the 1990s. In
part this can be attributed to technical problems in
operationalising a cross-cultural theory of such scope,
given the rather limited theoretical debate that accom-
panied its first formulation around 1970 (Vita-Finzi and
Higgs, 1970). But to a far larger extent, the study of
human territory has been the victim of a wider lack of
interest in human ecology by archaeologists, the result
of a bias to Culturalism within the dominant theoretical
approach of Post-Processualism, in which the environ-
ment has gone back to being a rather passive backdrop
to a world created in the human mind.
However, this is in spite of the impressive evidence
to show that recurrent patterns exist in human adaptation
to landscapes which have to be primarily economic rather
than purely symbolic in character, and which are closely
structured to the kind of physical environment in which
a society seeks its livelihood. Thus Dyson-Hudson and
Smith's (1978) striking general model (Fig. 4.1) matching
the degree of territoriality to the density and predictability
of resources, and applicable from hunter-gatherer to
mixed-farming scenarios, remains a potent insight into
cross-cultural settlement behaviour that matches closely
to empirical case-studies both ethnographic and his-
torical. A neat illustration can be provided by Wilkinson's
(1983) model of traditional territorial behaviour in south-
east Arabia (Fig. 4.2).
Amongst the core problems associated with Catchment
Analysis is the question of variable territory size and
social factors affecting the spacing and size of settlements.
Ellison and Harriss (1972) and Kent Flannery (1976)
provided pointers towards solving this problem by erecting
dynamic catchments which changed in size over time as
pioneer settlements matured within a specific district (Fig.
4.3), partitioning larger early territories into tesselations
at a smaller scale through settlement offshoots. Flannery' s
insights in Mexico, that this process occurred before
pioneer settlements had begun to use their large catchments
to a full degree, pointed to a social rather than economic
cause for progressive multiplication of settlements (Fig.
4.4). It should be noted that these archaeological studies
concentrate on the territorial behaviour of nucleated
communities: although similar principles can be identified
in the analysis of dispersed rural communities, in what
follows, for heuristic purposes, I shall also focus on
nucleated settlement forms.
TERRITORIAL SIZE AND SPACING
A review of documented territorial sizes, mainly for




















Figure 4.1 Model for the creation of human territoriality. (After Dyson-Hudson & Smith, 1978: fig. 1)
rva rvb
Figure 4.2 Concepts of radial territoriality in S.E.
Arabia. (After Wilkinson, 1983: fig. 2). la: permanent
cultivation (tree crops); lb·: permanent cultivation from
less reliable base flow (alfalfa); Π: seasonal crops; III:
village grazing and sown land; IVa: mixed-herding
nomads; IVb: camel-herding nomads.
Figure 4.3 Inset: Idealized model of settlement evolution
along the Atoyac River during three temporal phases
(Tl to T3). (After Flannery, 1976: fig. 6.8).
Figure 4.4 Early Formative villages along the Atoyac
River in the northeastern Valley of Oaxaca (Mexico).
Catchment circles with radii of 2.5 km (solid line -), 5.0
km (dashed line ). Evolution of territorial network
follows progression Tl to T2 to T3 catchment system
(After Flannery, 1976: fis. 4.7).
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or historians, provides evidence of recurrent quanta for
catchment radius, scaled in size from 5 km, to 3—4 km,
to 2-3 and finally 1-2 km radius. Where the evidence
permits a dynamic reconstruction over time, catchments
at the larger scale give way to those at a smaller scale —
this may be taken to counter the criticism that in reality
there is merely a spectrum of land-use ranges varying
according to landscape and land-use differences. Thus
in 9th century AD Brittany (Fig. 4.5) early Medieval
villages have on average territories of 3-4 km radius
(Davies 1988), but by High Medieval times a notable
multiplication of villages occurs throughout Northern
France, averaging to the next quantum of 2-3 km radius.
Likewise English Medieval villages have parishes which
frequently provide evidence of progressive fragmentation
from a common 2-3 km radius to 1-2 km. In Classical
Greece (Bintliff, 1994) villages tend to stabilize into 2-
3 km radii territories (Fig. 4.6).
Demographic processes
I would suggest that during the process of population
infill and subsequent demographic growth within a
particular region, smaller territories were carved out of
larger, but respecting the typical cross-cultural parameters
of the quanta listed earlier. A very simple mechanism
accounting for the recurrence of certain specific catchment
radii is a model whereby most new settlements arose via
fission out of older, adjacent settlements. When new areas
of the landscape remained to colonize, the existing radius
may have been continued for a new territory bordering
the ancestor, but when fission involved dividing up the
parent village lands into two to accommodate its daughter
settlement, a principle of equal partition would result in
tesselations at exactly the empirical radii. In other words
a 5 km radius tesselation fragmented by a factor of 2
produces a 3—4 km radius tesselation, the same process
for a 3-4 km radius tesselation produces a 2-3 km, and in
turn a 1-2 km radius tesselation. If, as Flannery argued,
pioneer settlements with up to 5 km radius were comfort-
ably overstocked with potential land and resources, 1-2
km radius catchments could well be a symptom of unusual
pressure of people on land; not surprisingly the commonest
radius seems to be a more stable 2—3 km radius, reflecting
sustainable population infill. It is incidentally quite likely
that colonisation may have taken place using a customary
territory module known in the ancestral village, so that
we need not postulate every district commencing with a
maximal mixed farming catchment of 5 km radius, but
expect many to exhibit pioneer settlement duplicating
maturer settlement system of 3-4 or even 2-3 km
territories. In any case it is noteworthy that the theoretical
model outlined here is strikingly similar to the observed
patterning in the colonisation of Northern Sweden analysed
by Bylund in his classic study of 1960,
Despite the plausibility of such a relatively simple
mechanism operating cross-culturally to produce the obser-
vable historical sequences of settlement dynamics, there
remains the challenge set by Flannery of offering a social
explanation for the earliest stage of internal subdivision
(the later stages and smallest radii do seem to reflect a
traditional model, with pressure of population growth
figure 4.5 Ninth-century AD plèbes and plebiculae (villages and hamlets) in Brittany. (After Davies, 1988: fig. 11).
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Figure 4.6 Known (solid symbol) and hypothesized (question-marks) nucleated settlements in the Classical era for
the region ofBoeotia, Central Greece. Cities indicated by triangles, villages circles. Best-fit circles of 2.5 km radius
have been placed within village-city subsistence territories first defined through Thiessen-polygons (solid line
cells). Shading represents infertile uplands. (From Bintliff, 1994).
causing increased settlement density associated with more
intensive food production within smaller territories).
Social processes
Although Flannery did not offer specific social processes
for the early fission and subdivision of pioneer villages
and their lands, respectively, the independent studies of
two anthropologists do provide us with a promising
explanation. In 1972 the social anthropologist Anthony
Forge suggested from ethnographic studies that villages
tend to fission at a size of circa 150 people to sustain a
face-to-face form of social interaction; either a new
settlement comes into being, or an existing settlement
undergoes internal subdivision into distinct social groups
maintaining the small scale community relationships. In
1992 the physical anthropologist Robin Dunbar proposed
an identical model of community fission at around 150
individuals, based on a mechanism linking brain mor-
phology to the memorisable face-to-face social group
(Dunbar 1992, 1996). The modern Hutterites of North
America do in fact carry out a conscious rule of settlement
fragmentation at 125 individuals to preserve communal
harmony. The alternative to founding a daughter com-
munity is either Forge's internal social fragmentation via
clans or other horizontal systems, or vertical fragmentation
in which the social group is dominated by a form of
political stratification.
In circumstances in which colonising or infilling
villages have a significant investment in face-to-face
social interactions, we might therefore expect to find a
recurrent network of settlement foundations typified by
average populations under 200 or so people and a
progressive reduction in territory (from 5 -> 3/4 -> 2-
3 km radius) or alternatively the replication of a mature,
stable radius territory (commonly 2-3 km). In searching
for a large database with which to test such a model
(archaeological catchment studies being numerically
rather limited) I was drawn to the potential offered by
the English Domesday Book of 1086, which provides
information on some 13,400 medieval communities (Fig.
4.7). Hallam's (1981) study summarizes average village
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4.7 settlements in Domesday Book. (After Hill, 1981: fig. 25, reproduced with the kind permission
of David Hill).
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size from this considerable database (Fig. 4.8), and
suggests a remarkable agreement with our predictions
for a rapidly colonising society in which social group
size is the primary control on settlement size. It is thus
not surprising that archaeologists commonly quote typical
village size for early farming communities in the Near
East at around 50-200 individuals, or for the Neolithic
of the Balkans at around 60-120 individuals. Indeed the
social process model in itself could be seen as a
significant element in the rapid spread of farming
settlements across the Old World, outpacing maximal
land-use by pioneer agricultural communities which has
often been the explanation put forward in the past (but
which falls down on the empirical evidence).
DYNAMIC FACTORS
One major problem, however, which arises from a village
fission at between 100-200 villages or less, is that of
inbreeding. As Martin Wobst showed in influential
studies (1974, 1976), the minimum community size to
ensure a wide choice of mates who are not near relatives
is around 4-500 individuals. The tendency in almost all
recorded ethnohistoric societies to avoid small-group
endogamy' is clearly at odds with the equally strong
pressure for the maintenance of small group size in
relatively egalitarian farming societies. A contradiction
between attraction and repulsion would seem to be a

























Figure 4.8 Summary statistics for average village size
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Figure 4.9 The undersized territory of the community ofValdemora, Spain (from Freeman, 1970, Map 2).
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as they are between two social gravitational forces, or to
use the terms of Dynamic Complexity Theory - strange
attractors (Lewin 1993; Bintliff 1997).
Indeed, European village ethnography identifies exactly
such a tension in small communities, such as Valdemora
(Fig. 4.9), the subject of Susan Freeman's (1968 & 1970)
Spanish village case-study, whose inhabitants wish they
were a large village or pueblo and not the victim of a
constant exogamy with its alienation of village property
through dowry. Tak, likewise, in Tuscany (1990) empha-
sizes the tensions that erupt into physical aggression as
well as systematic verbal denigration (campanillsmo),
between rural communities divided by land disputes on
their borders but forced to exchange marriage partners
and alienate communal resources to their neighbours2.
A resolution to these contrary pressures would be an
expansion of village size until it reached or surpassed the
Wobstian threshold for a viable endogamous community,
or at least - since some gene flow is probably desirable
from outside the district for long-term adaptation -
allowing the majority of marriages to be conducted within
the community. This means a population of 4-500 or
more. Exactly this form of expansion underlies Freeman's
model for the corporate community in European village
development. Having achieved such a size, the village
gains possession of almost all its resources and begins to
take on mini-state attributes of communal organisation.
In Early Modern Tuscany, when central state power was
weak, such villages even waged smallscale wars on each
other over resource disputes (Fig. 4.10).
Enlarging the community in this way, nonetheless,
breaks the face-to-face society and either calls into being
a formal subdivision into horizontal social groups within
the village (as in the classic south-western States Pueblo
Indian settlements), or more commonly is achieved through
a vertical stratification in which communal decisions are
dominated by a minority in the village. European village
ethnographies again suggest that village councils are the
preserve of the better-off male heads of land-owning
families, a principle which often preserves the efficacy of
the less than 200 face-to-face society within the confines
of the dominant male group within the enlarged village3.
PHASE A: Village Fission = Colonisation with low
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Figure 4.10 A model for the transformation from a face-
to-face settlement to one largely endogamous and
ripe for the development of a corporate community.
Numbers refer to population range of settlements.
THE 'NORMAL' POLIS
Of the 700-800 city_states of the Classical Aegean for which
data are available:
- 80% have populations of 2000-4000 people, and maximal
territories of 5-6 kilometres radius
Figure 4.11 Summary average statistics for Greek city-
states (from Ruschenbusch, 1985).
THE RISE OF THE GREEK CITY-STATE
I have elsewhere discussed in more detail the deep
implications of these tendencies for our understanding
of early historic societies in Archaic Greece and Italy,
and other cross-cultural scenarios (e.g. the first urban
societies of the Early Bronze Age in the Levant). Here
let me merely summarize the case of the rise of the
Greek city-state or Polis in the period circa 750-500
BC. We can immediately become aware of the relevance
of corporate village theory when we consider Ruschen-
bush's (1985) statistics for Greek city states (Fig. 4.11).
We can see why the historical geographer Ernst Kirsten
accurately perceived that the typical Greek city-state
was no more than a village-state (Dorfstaat) in both origin
and indeed function in the landscape (Kirsten, 1956).
I would conceive of the evolution of the city-state
network as follows (cf. Bintliff, 1994). Initially Dark
Age settlements were few and widely-spaced, and small.
Through the process of fission at densities below 200
people per village, population recovery by early historic
(Archaic) times had resulted in a mature settlement
network with approximately 2.5 km radius territories
per village. Although there were already some sizeable
and powerful village-towns, a very large number of the
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smaller villages grew towards or past the size of the
corporate community of largely endogamous families
(i.e. around 500 citizens), and claimed statehood or at
least a high level of political autonomy from their
neighbours (protopoleis). Over the two centuries of the
Archaic era, however, most of these aspirant city-states
were swallowed-up, often forcibly, by a minority of the
most powerful village-states in each district. Thus the
mature city-state by Classical times (after 500 BC) had
increased its average territorial radius to enclose not
only the core 2-3 km radius of the dominant village, but
the territory of one or more subordinate villages/ hamlets
which may formerly have laid claim to autonomy
(Archaic protopoleis). The consequent average radius
of 5-6 km approximates to Catchment Theory maxima
for regular intensive farming from a single point, implying
perhaps that the leading settlement was thus enabled to
farm the lands of its satellites (obtained through inter-
marriage and a land market) to full efficiency (the
imbalance of growth in the dominant settlement within
small central-place networks requires support from the
surplus production of satellite communities - as has been
modelled for early urban systems in North Mesopotamia
- Wilkinson 1994; see also Shiel, this volume).
Most Greek city-states were controlled politically by
the middle and upper class (hoplite and hippeis), an
adult male sector of society commonly put at around a
third to a half of the citizen male community. Allowing
for women, children and slaves, and some resident aliens,
a face-to-face politically-active male group of 150 could
still represent a total city population of around 2000
people. Ruschenbusch's averages show that at the lower
end of the typical city-state population, a close personal
society may still have operated, whereas at the upper
end there would have been factions and patronage
networks when face-to-face knowledge ceased to be
effective.
Another central aspect of Greek city-state society was
the general concept that the polis was an integral town
and country unit, where citizens were typically identified
through rights to ancestral holdings in the chora or
territory of the urban focus. This is identical to the
corporate community structure of traditional European
villages of the Early Modern period, and I would argue
that this arises at the point where the predominance of
endogamy within an expanded communal mating pool
hands over control of communal lands to the inhabitants
of the main settlement, or more correctly the male
landholders of a certain status.
CONCLUSION
It can be argued that such a model, connecting a shift
from a face-to-face society to a larger corporate com-
munity of 500 or more members, with a stronger political
control structure legislating over the utilisation of the
settlement's territory, has excellent cross-cultural poten-
tial for providing insights into the genesis of city-states
in many different periods and regions (e.g. the Bronze
Age of the Near East, Medieval north-central Italy). It
also has unsuspected potential for explaining the elabor-
ation of complex village organisation that stops short of
city-state formation (the Dorfstaat model), a development
far more frequent than normally realised. Thus in the
transition from Early to High Medieval times in large
swathes of north-west Europe, circa 1000 AD, the face-
to-face fissioning villages of 150 or less, frequently
expand in a period of rapid demographic growth to two
or three times that size. Along with the predictable
subdivision of territories which this usually occasioned,
and the colonisation of marginal lands, there are clear
signs of the creation of corporate communities within
these villages, which were closely involved with the
overall management of village resources. Fox (1992)
has argued, for example, that the shift from a patchwork
of individual peasant estates combining arable and
pasture to the classic 2- and 3-field communitarian
farming regime, a dramatic'landscape alteration occurring
across the same transition period, is a calculated response
by the village corporate community and its feudal lords
to the requirements to rationalise the use of territory
under population pressure. In the absence of powerful
feudal lords and strong overarching state structures, these
repetitive processes might otherwise have led to in-
numerable small, competing polities such as in ancient
Greece. Indeed this could be suggested to have occurred
in the context of a weak feudalism in north-central Italy
at the same time-period, when several hundred city-states
emerged claiming various degrees of autonomy, and as
Figure 4.12 A traditional hill-village/town in Italy
(from Silverman, 1975, Figure 3).
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Tak showed for Early Modern Tuscany, even recent
villages can show behavioural tendencies in this direction
when the state is ineffective. Still today the inhabitants
of the large hilltop villages of Italy (Fig. 4.12) exhibit a
strong degree of internalised cohesion that makes them
proudly pronounce that they are villagers by day,
townspeople at night.
NOTES
1 Cross-cultural ethnohistorical research underlines the near-
universality of marriage-restrictions on close-kin in recorded
human societies. Biological anthropologists confirm the reality
of deleterious inbreeding as a powerful element in accounting
for kin-group exogamy as an adaptive mechanism. Indeed
evidence for comparable out-movement by male or female apes
and monkeys suggests that the practice may well have its roots
amongst our pre-modern ancestors. I am grateful to Professor
Bob Layton (Durham University) for helpful discussions on
this topic.
2 An alternative means of preserving patrimony within a single
settlement, to increasing community size, might be unogeniture
- where a single son or daughter inherited in each household
and remained there to replace the parental generation, and no
resources moved with out-marrying further sons or daughters.
This would seem to create a rather static or 'closed' household
resource system, in contrast to a dowry-system, where an 'open'
system would create a lively market for mates with advantageous
dowry-wealth. Ethnohistory offers many examples of both
systems (with a perhaps more readable set of examples for the
mate-market being the dominant theme in the novels of Jane
Austen). Once a precedent was set for endowing children, a
chain-effect could be envisaged causing rapid social differenti-
ation within the networked community, as those who could,
married their offspring to wealthier partners and enhanced any
pre-existing land or stock differentials between families. In
terms of the rise of corporate nucleated agricultural communities
where land-ownership is largely the basis for civil rights in
'proto-city states', the basic model I am putting forward in this
essay, we must assume that at least male offspring retain the
option of full citizenship through land-ownership, and that
therefore sons (and probably also daughters) in such emergent
complex societies preserve shares in the community's land and
stock through inheritance or dowry. The implications for the
enhancement of internal social stratification would be worth
further research as an additional factor in the greater political
and economic complexity of such nucleated settlements - not
least when we seek to explain how they can be managed at
population levels above Dunbar's theoretical, face-to-face range.
As I discuss later in this paper, it is indeed the case that corporate
village and city-state communities are commonly controlled
politically by the wealthier group of landholders, even if all
landholders tend to have de facto civil rights or full citizenship.
3 I have already noted that two 'attractors' come into opposition
in the possible repetitive trajectories of nucleated communities:
the social fission model, boosted by pressures for exogamy, and
that in which the Wobstian-threshold is overcome by enlarging
the settlement - with considerable effects on enhancing corporate
activity. Why - and it clearly happened repeatedly in societies
throughout the world and since later prehistory - and how -
was the strong tendency for settlements to remain small - broken,
with important results for social evolution? One answer, with
practical examples at hand, is through Forge's horizontal
subdivision of a growing settlement; if larger villages are really
agglomerations of clans or otherwise related kin-groups, between
which exogamy is practised and resources circulate, then
centripetal tendencies can increase alongside a rising population.
Clearly more intensive use of the settlement's territory seems a
requirement of this pattern - could it be a causative factor, too?
Forge's alternative — vertical subdivision of a large settlement
through social stratification, is a factor already discussed in
Note 3 as a potentially significant element in the emergence of
complex nucleated settlements. A reorientation of social focus
away from communal solidarity based on face-to-face politics
of an entire settlement is replaced in these two models by
agglomerations of social groups - each internally focussed on a
clan, patron-client, or social class, or similar subgrouping - the
confederate enlarged settlement being bonded through shared
commitment to the perceived compensatory advantages of a
corporate community. Clearly these are preliminary speculations
requiring or encouraging future research. What I doubt very
much is an argument in which complex villages arise merely
through the impact of existing state systems, as a form of
collective cohesion germinated by external threat. Firstly some
of the most interesting examples of our phenomenon either
predate state societies (eg the 'supernova' settlements such as
Chatal Huyuk), or arose precisely because of the collapse,
weakness, or local absence of state systems (city-states in the
Early Bronze Age of the Levant, city-states in Archaic Greece
and north-central Italy, city-states in Medieval north-central
Italy, village-states in Early Modern Tuscany). In my view, the
main value of the complex-village model presented in this essay
is in fact to provide a basic building-block for the creation of
territorial states, rather than seeing the latter as explaining the
former.
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